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as the importance of alternative forms of organization emerge as the most salient findings. 
 
 
  Key words: Enterprise, innovation, industrialization, technology, developing countries, industrial 
organization,  institutions, public sector. 
 
 






* Simon Teitel & Associates and International Center for Economic Research (ICER), Turin, Italy.  e-
mail: steitel@starpower.net 
 
Comments by R. Howse, E. Londero, R. Teitel and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. 
They are not responsible for remaining errors. 
 
  UNDERSTANDING FIRM PERFORMANCE:  
 
    2 
  The Case of Developing Countries's Firms that Compete Internationally 




  Introduction  
 
  This paper is concerned with a narrow subset of the overall question of understanding the 
behavior of the firm: how to reckon with the performance of firms in developing countries that possess 
advanced technological assets and use them to compete in international markets?  
 
  Relying on cases analyzed in Teitel (2006) we apply insights from the industrial organization, 
economic development and innovation literature, to contrast actual performance with the received 
theory of the firm. In particular, we rely on Schumpeter's (1934, 1950) views about the innovating 
entrepreneur, notions of structural impediments present in developing countries (specially institutional 
and skills constraints), as well as a conceptualization of technological and industrial development as 
evolutionary processes occurring at firm, sector and country levels (see Teitel, 1987).   
 
  It will be our contention that neither the traditional conception of private entrepreneurship, nor 
the received theory of the firm, are very useful to understand the accomplishments of a number of firms 
in countries at a relatively low level of industrial and technological development that have nevertheless 
managed to compete in technologically advanced industries with major enterprises based in highly 
industrialized countries.  
 
  In attempting to explain these apparently paradoxical findings we shall be guided by reference to 
three key factors:  skills, institutions and policies. It seems intuitively clear that such factors do not 
operate independently or in isolation from one another. Thus without their requisite skilled manpower, 
institutions cannot work and policies cannot be implemented. However, in principle, lack of skills can be  
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remedied at any time through short and long term educational and training policies, including, inter-alia, 
the necessary institutional build up. Similarly, policies will have little chance of being implemented in the 
absence of a minimum institutional infrastructure. Nevertheless, without disregarding the extent and 
nature of their interactions, it will be useful, for analytical purposes, to examine these factors individually.  
  
  According to the theory of the firm the main economic justification for its the existence of firms 
resides in their ability to lower transaction costs by internalizing a number of operational and 
coordinating activities otherwise performed by multiple actors external to the enterprise (see, for 
example, Hirshleifer, 1984). Could we then anticipate that acquiring advanced technological capabilities 
and international competitiveness in the production of new, sophisticated, products and services, in a 
developing country milieu, falls within the purview of private firm decision-making? Or do such 
undertakings demanding innovative entrepreneurship not necessarily require private sector firm 
structures? 
 
  The paper is organized as follows: Part I contains the case evidence, Part II describes the 
effects of such factors as policies, institutions and skills, Part III contrasts the findings with precepts from 
the literature on innovation and entrepreneurship, industrial organization, and economic development. 
The paper closes with a brief section of summary and conclusions. 
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  I.Case Evidence 
 
A. Nuclear Engineering in Argentina: In the Beginning There Was an Institution 
  Acquisition of Argentina's technological capability in nuclear reactor engineering took place in 
the National Atomic Energy Commission, (NAEC), preceding the creation of INVAP, a joint, federal-
state public firm spinned off by the NAEC. Additional technical and engineering skills were obtained via 
R&D and fellowship programs instituted by the National Council for  Scientific and Technological 
Research (CONICET), and learning-by-doing during the construction of Argentina's first atomic power 
plants. 
 
  It could however be argued that in the marketing of its technological capabilities, including 
participating in international tenders in competition with firms from industrialized countries, INVAP has 
benefitted from its access to entrepreneurial autonomy. This is perhaps best exemplified by its recent 
success in winning a major contract to construct a research nuclear reactor in Australia.  
 
  The military-instigated government (G) policy of assigning priority to the acquisition of atomic 
power capabilities obviously came first, and it resulted in the creation of a relatively strong institution, the 
NAEC, with sufficient resources and autonomy to pursue its assigned objective. The G further 
contributed by embarking in a series of investments in nuclear power plants to diversify the country's 
energy supply sources. NAEC's lobbying for domestic participation in the construction of the first 
atomic power plants won G support and was instrumental in acquiring local engineering and construction 
capabilities while supplying parts and equipment to the foreign builders. 
 
   Needless to say, acquisition of the nuclear engineering skills required a thorough understanding  
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of atomic physics, an incipient but relatively good quality specialization among physics and chemistry 
students in Argentine universities at that time
1. The acquisition of advanced nuclear engineering skills was 
enhanced by a program of scholarships abroad implemented with CONICET's support. The NAEC 
also received technical assistance through the regional metallurgy program administered by the 
Organization of American States (OAS). 
    
  In this case, the original entrepreneurial motivation did not arise from a private firm, nor was 
such a type of organizational structure responsible for the acquisition of technological assets and their 
underlying skills. The innovation-investment sequence seems to have started with G policy (P), leading 
to institutional (I) build up and then skills (S) acquisition and further institutional creation, or change. 
Schematically: P - I - S - I .....  
 
B. Aeronautical Industry in Brazil: Public Design and Market Building Regulation 
  Development of a domestic aerospace industry in Brazil took initially the form of the creation of 
a public firm, EMBRAER, that acquired private partners much later, and, remarkably, has recently gone 
public at a time when major aircraft firms in industrialized countries seem to be unable to compete 
internationally without G subsidies. EMBRAER also managed to enter partnership agreements with 
major public and private aeronautical firms to complement its technical assets, including the joint design 
and construction of new civilian and military aircraft models.   
 
  G support continued to be critical for EMBRAER's success all along. First, by protecting the 
firm from foreign competition in the domestic market. Then, by earmarking a portion of public defense 
                      
    
1 Indirect evidence of the quality of their training was the ability of 
Argentine graduates to obtain work in atomic laboratories and universities in 
Europe and the USA at a time when such openings were badly lacking in the 
country.   
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procurement for EMBRAER, and, more recently, by providing export financing subsidies that allowed it 
to compete abroad. Public support was also critical in securing its initial commuter aircraft design. 
 
  EMBRAER succeeded in the US market with its first commuter plane, the Bandeirante, whose 
design it obtained from a public research institute (CTA) which also collaborated with the firm in 
successive plane development. With a seat configuration for 19 passengers, EMBRAER aptly 
capitalized on a US air-transport regulation requiring a flight assistant in commuter planes with 20 
passengers or more, thus helping regional airlines to lower their operating costs. 
 
  The process of EMBRAER's creation seems to have followed the sequence: G policy launching 
the industry-firm, concomitant institutional development of aeronautical infrastructure, followed by the 
acquisition of skills, and further policy support in domestic and foreign markets: P - I - S - P .... 
   
  In both cases above, public entrepreneurial motivation seems to have originated with the military 
who influenced governmental decision-making when those initiatives had a critical need for financial and 
political support. While their success apparently validated the vision of the initial supporters, it is hard to 
imagine that such initiatives could garner similar support in the present trade and technology global 
environment (see, for example, Teitel, 2005, pp. 458-59). 
 
C. Korean Designed Digital Telephony Switches: Public R&D to Leapfrog Technology 
  For successful R&D to develop their own national digital switching system (TDX), Koreans 
relied on public entrepreneurial leadership. This was the more remarkable in view of the fact that, 
although in limited scale, local producers were already manufacturing such equipment locally, and that, 
following Japan's example, Korean  industrial and technological landscape was (and is) dominated by 
very large conglomerates. Moreover, the scheme was audacious in that it sought to leapfrog the  
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analogue phase and jump to digital technology for which little knowledge or experience existed in the 
country. Also in the best Korean (Japanese inspired) tradition foreign investment participation was 
initially avoided.  
 
  Distinguishing this experience is the fact that no enterprise structure was established, with the 
project being managed by a G ministry and involving a national sectorial research institute (first the 
KTRI and then the ETRI), the prospective main customer, (the public telephone agency), as well as 
some conglomerates attracted by the expectation of large future sales (and profits), if the project were 
to succeed. However, private interests did not play the key entrepreneurial, or coordinating, role, which 
fell to the G. Once the digital switches were successfully designed the consortium R&D project structure 
was abandoned. 
 
  This initiative was also G inspired, starting with a policy to harness R&D resources to develop 
and produce Korean designed switches which would allow them to leapfrog the analogue phase and 
jump to a digital system when the country's telecommunication network was still in an embryonic stage. 
Relying on domestic technical institutions and skills, a major R&D project was launched, supported, and 
coordinated by G institutions. It generated the envisaged designs for digital switches which were later on 
successfully manufactured and exported, with  additional skills being learned in the process. Thus the 
sequence followed seems to have been: P - I - S .... 
   
D. Taiwanese Made Computers: Developing Country Expatriates Supplying MNCs.  
  The story of ACER's creation and development falls more clearly within the traditional 
conceptual purview of the private sector firm and its coordinating advantages. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that when settling back in Taiwan from their respective sojourns abroad, the founding engineers 
brought with them some of the assets crucial to their future success. Namely, their advanced training and  
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the experience of having worked in major information technology (IT) firms for which, upon returning, 
they started to do subcontracting work producing lower cost equivalents of foreign-designed computers 
and their parts. Additional technical assets were also acquired as a result of cooperating with their 
foreign clients and other international firms.  
 
  Later on, through its own R&D capabilities, ACER was also able to modify existing chip 
designs, as well as to design its own, improved versions, of new chips earning several patents in the 
process. Moreover, it also succeeded in selling products under its own brand name besides those 
produced for its multinational clients. 
 
  ACER was able to capitalize on the skills and contacts acquired by its founders while working 
for major IT firms. The key to this contractual or "institutional" arrangement resided in their ability to use 
similar, highly efficient, manufacturing and management techniques, in a lower cost environment. 
Moreover, skill creation and enhancement also took place leading to their own "chip" designs. They 
were also successful in marketing a substantial share of output under their own brand name. 
 
  Thus we are in the presence of a sequence: S - I - P..., where in this case the P (policy) refers 
to internal, private firm, policies, and not to public ones. In fact, ACER seems to have taken no 
advantage from significant Taiwanese G initiatives to support SMEs firms in the S&T area, including a 
major "science" park and consortia set up to help with the financing of R&D projects.   
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  II. Factors, their Effects and Interactions 
 
A. Policies 
  These include all G interventions that result, directly, or implicitly, in changes in market prices or 
quantities. In Argentina their first effect was in favoring nuclear energy as a source of power. While the 
armed forces original motivation may have been acquiring a strategic, subcontinental, lead in the 
development of nuclear arms, strong diplomatic pressure by major international powers resulted in the 
channeling of this potential towards peaceful applications such as domestic power generation and 
research reactor engineering.  
 
  The nuclear power policy took its most important and effective embodiment in the creation of a 
leading institution, the National Atomic Energy Commission (NAEC), which was entrusted with 
becoming the main depository of the scientific knowledge and technical skills that the development of 
atomic energy sources in the country would require. Moreover, once the construction of nuclear power 
plants was approved, the NAEC sought, and obtained, contractual clauses to permit a degree of "un-
packing" of the design and construction technologies, as well as training of its personnel and 
procurement participation by local industry. Thus policies for the acquisition of knowledge, and learning-
by-doing, were also implemented by the G through NAEC's initiatives.  
 
  Supplementary policies to enhance the basic scientific and engineering skills of Argentine 
physicists, chemists and engineers were carried out via another institution, the CONACYT (now 
CONICET), that financed local R&D projects and fellowships abroad. The G later also supported 
export of research and training reactors via capital goods export financing schemes.    
  In Brazil there was similarly a G desire to develop a local aerospace industry to attain both a  
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measure of national independence in the provision of training aircraft for the armed forces, as well as 
commuter planes for the potentially large aero-transport domestic market. Defense considerations were 
also important given the vastness of the country and the lack of roads or other transportation means 
which made many remote areas only accessible by plane. However, it would be hard to argue that the 
G foresaw the development of an enterprise, or industry, that would become one of the largest 
exporters and foreign exchange earners for the country. 
 
  Creation and growth of the enterprise were also favored by the design and other technical 
support it obtained from nearby public aeronautical R&D facilities, particularly the Center of 
Aeronautical Technology (CTA), which provided it with the design of its first commuter jet plane, 
successful in the domestic market, and later on in the US.   
 
  The G supported EMBRAER by protecting the domestic market from foreign imports of similar 
commuter planes. Moreover, it also favored the firm as a supplier of training planes for the Brazilian 
armed forces. Later on, the G provided critical financial subsidies for EMBRAER's exports that allowed 
the firm to compete with well established manufacturers in developed countries. Through FINEP/BNDE 
supported programs the G also favored R&D work carried out by EMBRAER. 
   
    In Korea the G provided the initial inspiration and entrepreneurial vision to create a domestic 
R&D capacity to design digital telephony switching equipment and thus help the country to leapfrog the 
analogue stage in telephone communications. While in envisaging the provision of the public good of 
indigenous switch design the G exhibited Schumpeterian innovative attributes, this did not directly lead 
to the creation of any specific firm but just to coordination of a major R&D project. 
 
  Thus similarly to the Argentine and Brazilian cases, initial policy support was based on pursuing  
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a public good: nationalism as embodied in technical and economic autonomy (see Johnson, 1967, ch. 
III), which could hardly be perceived and adopted as such by the private sector. The managerial role 
was then assigned to a G Ministry which assumed the coordination of the various participants: technical 
research institutes, future producers, and future major domestic client. Once the switching equipment 
was successfully designed and produced, the G saw to it that it would be adopted domestically and later 
on also provided export promotion  policies for its dissemination abroad. It is also worthwhile noting 
that the G supported a policy of domestic knowledge creation with minimum foreign participation via the 
importation of technology or capital.  
   
  In ACER's case,  policies refer to strategic decisions adopted by the firm since the G had no 
role in its inception or development. Critical to its success were decisions as to how much to produce 
for their clients under their internationally recognized names vis a vis output sold under ACER's own 
brand name. Similarly, initial dependence on technology mostly provided by their customers, was 
eventually supplemented by own R&D that resulted in significant modifications of existing computer 
chips as well as the design of some new chips of their own. A measure of their R&D success are the 
patents that some of their major international customers have been willing to license from ACER. 
 
B. Institutions 
  Different types of institutions have been of significant importance in the cases reviewed. Our 
take on "institutions" in this paper is quite general in nature. Given the existence of transaction costs and 
limitations to the flow of information among key reasons for market failures, institutions are the name 
given to all sort of industrial organization arrangements, including at one extreme the enterprise and at 
the other the market(s) in which it operates.  
 
  As noted above, in Argentina's quest for nuclear power knowledge and its application, a public  
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agency (NAEC) became the key institutional depository of the scientific and technical knowledge 
required to operate as well as to design research and training atomic reactors for domestic use and later 
export. In fact, there was no initial attempt to create an enterprise the spinning off of INVAP being a 
much later step taken to facilitate the marketing of the acquired technical assets in domestic and foreign 
markets.  
 
  For Brazil's objective of acquiring an autonomous aeronautical capacity, the (public) enterprise 
was the institution of choice, but with the support of complementary institutions. This was particularly 
important initially, when EMBRAER relied on the CTA for the design of its first commuter plane, the 
Bandeirante. Other institutions played also an important role, particularly R&D programs supported by 
the BNDE.  
 
  As a public enterprise, with a tiny private minority, EMBRAER, was able to achieve significant 
breakthroughs in both the technical and commercial areas. It also exhibited flexibility in its ability to 
arrange partnerships with major foreign aircraft manufacturers which were important to acquire new 
technologies and to share in new plane design and development. In its recent, and more mature phase, 
EMBRAER was able to go to the stock market and become a largely private, publicly listed, firm, 
which competes with firms from major industrialized countries in the international market for regional 
jets. 
 
  For Korea's objective to acquire an autonomous research and design capacity in the digital 
telephony switching equipment field, the institutional solution was not to create a firm, but to organize an 
R&D consortium coordinated by a G agency. Among the major institutions participating, besides the 
telecommunications ministry, were the Korean Telecommunications Research Institute (KTRI) (later 
replaced by the Electric Technological Research Institute (ETRI)), Korean Telecom, as well as various  
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local private producers.  
 
  Thus the R&D project was the arena in which transaction costs had to be lowered via efficient 
coordination. Later on, when the design objective had been achieved, the G withdrew from the scene 
and let the manufacturing firms organize production to supply  domestic and eventually foreign markets. 
It could be argued that the key objective was to attain the technological asset that consisted in the R&D 




  In Taiwan, instead, a private firm was the institutional arrangement used to internalize the newly 
acquired IT knowledge and experience of its founders, as well as the contacts made while working with 
major IT firms abroad.  
 
C. Skills       
  In all cases a specific, advanced, technological asset was attained that  constituted a basis for 
success in international competitive markets. Mastery of those advanced technologies required a gamut 
of technical and engineering skills. Acquisition of those skills was made possible by a variety of policy 
and institutional arrangements.   
 
  In Argentina, engineering skills for the design and construction of nuclear research reactors 
required a scientific grounding in atomic physics plus the chemistry of nuclear reactions and specialized 
metallurgy for radiation containment vessels, etc. The basic principles of those disciplines were imparted 
                      
    
2 In this sense the Korean achievement is in some ways similar to the 
Argentine acquisition of technological capabilities in the nuclear engineering 
field, since INVAP, the firm spinned off from NAEC, was more in the nature of 
an afterthought and mostly to facilitate marketing undertakings.  
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in local universities while a good deal of applied technical knowledge was acquired by on-the-job-
training and learning-by-doing. Instrumental was also a program of fellowships for study abroad 
instituted by the NAEC with the support of the CONICET.  
 
  The NAEC was also responsible for negotiating contracts with foreign constructors of the 
atomic energy power plants ATUCHA I and II that allowed for learning-by-doing of its personnel 
during the execution of those investment projects, as well as the granting of preferential procurement 
allowances for domestic industry. While all those skills were accumulated in the NAEC, and to some 
extent among local suppliers, the creation of INVAP facilitated their application and marketing in 
international undertakings.  
 
  Engineering and design skills were also acquired locally by EMBRAER, but with significant help 
from public aeronautical research institutes, in particular CTA, that provided the design of its first 
commuter plane. Additional advanced technologies were acquired via partnership agreements with 
international aerospace companies. Firm R&D projects were supported by BNDE financed programs. 
 
  In Korea's case, the new technology was acquired via a G sponsored and coordinated R&D 
project. Engineering and technical skills were, for the most part, locally available and were successfully 
harnessed to attain the desired digital switch design (TDX). The project was started at the KTRI and 
later on transferred to the ETRI with these institutes providing technical leadership. Once achieved, the 
design was implemented by local manufacturers for both domestic and export applications. 
 
  ACER brought the computer manufacturing technology to Taiwan via the expatriation of a 
group of local engineers who trained and worked abroad for major IT firms. Their skills were the result 
of local education plus experience working abroad. Imported technologies were further enhanced by  
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own R&D leading to several international patents.  
 
  Table 1 shows schematically the role played by the three key factors (policies, institutions, and 
skills), as well as the various levels at which they operated in the four cases reviewed. 
 
 
  Table 1. Contributing Factors in the Acquisition of Advanced Technological Assets 
       Factor    Nuclear Eng.   
     (Argentina) 
    Aircraft          
  (Brazil) 
  Dig. 
Telephony      
(Korea) 
   Computers      
     (Taiwan) 
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KTRI and ETRI  
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Basic elect. eng. 
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skills in local 
universities 







how provided by  
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clients 
Skills, 3rd level  Partic. in power 
plant constr. and 












   III. A Conceptual Framework? 
 
  As stated initially, we can look at the evidence through three different lenses, or economic 
thinking perspectives: entrepreneurship and innovation as conceived by Schumpeter, institutional 
theories of industrial organization, and  theories of economic development.  
 
  A. Innovation and Entrepreneurship 
  For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur and his innovating activity play the key roles in economic 
development. Schumpeter conceived innovation as entailing not necessarily  original creativity or 
invention. Innovators could be imitators who introduce a product, service or process, already known 
and applied elsewhere, to a new market or location becoming in that way a "creator" for that 
environment. Entrepreneurship a la Schumpeter (see, Nelson and Winter, p. 277), is, almost by 
definition, a scarce commodity in developing countries. Occasionally, as we shall see, this void can be 
filled by G intervention, with or without private sector participation
3.  
 
                      
    3  Take for example the large scale investments in the production of flat 
steel products and basic petrochemicals plants in Brazil during the 1960s and 
early 1970s. Although conventional wisdom would have predicted that given the 
size and growth prospects of the Brazilian economy, private capital markets 
would have been adequate to finance such investments, in fact they did not, 
with the private sector only participating in joint ventures at a later stage. 
Thus these projects were instead promoted and implemented by national 
development institutions with the cooperation of major development lending 
international agencies.  
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  Seen this way all four cases include innovations. Breaking into the atomic power field was 
indeed a local, and for a while, regional breakthrough in Latin America. Similarly, designing and building 
military training and commuter aircraft was an innovation for Brazil. In Korea's case, there was a clear 
innovation when they succeeded in designing their own versions of digital switching equipment and later 
introducing them in domestic and foreign markets. Finally, the ACER team introduced computer 
equipment and parts manufacturing, and later on chip designs, to the Taiwanese market, albeit initially 
mostly to supply foreign clients.   
 
  What differs significantly from the received notion of the innovating entrepreneur given by 
Schumpeter, and others, is the character it assumed in our cases. In Argentina, these were public, or 
political, entrepreneurs, who assumed no personal financial risk, but perhaps the political risk inherent in 
their pushing ahead with the acquisition of nuclear engineering capabilities. Even that danger was at times 
probably not perceived by them, particularly when the armed forces controlled or influenced political 
power. Nevertheless, it took entrepreneurship, though not necessarily of the private variety, to build 
institutions and provide support to the incipient nuclear engineering capabilities being developed under G 
protection.  
  For EMBRAER there was similarly a cadre of promoting public servants that pursued, together 
with representatives of the armed forces, the dream, if not of self-sufficiency, at least of a respectable 
local aircraft design and construction capability.  
 
  In Korea, G entrepreneurship was the engine of the R&D project, publicly coordinated, to 
develop their own version of digital telephone switches which allowed them to leapfrog the analogue 
phase altogether.  
 
  Finally, in the ACER case, we have an entrepreneurial effort which comes closer to the  
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Schumpeterian image. A team of expatriates conceived, with the cooperation of some of their prior 
employers, and future clients, to assemble and manufacture computer parts and equipment in a lower 
cost environment, but providing substantial assurances of quality and dependable supply production. 
The ACER team had additional innovations to their credit, such as  the switch to manufacturing under 
their own brand name, and the carrying out of successful chip improvements and new designs.  
 
  B. Industrial Organization 
  New theories of industrial organization (IO) (see Williamson, 1985 and 2005), rely on an 
institutional conceptual foundation, and their key analytical concept is the "transaction cost". Reduction, 
or elimination, of transaction costs becomes the rationale for institution building, from the market to the 
enterprise, and including hybrid forms in between. Thus, the enterprise, and particularly its private 
variety, represents the lower cost solution for the coordination of multiple agents required to produce 
goods or services under capitalistic economic systems.  
 
  This variety of IO has moved away considerable from the traditional type which inferred 
"function" from market "structures" and characterized those particularly by the number of operators. 
Anti-monopoly efficiency solutions were predicated with the help of antitrust law (see, Scherer, 1986 
for example). With technological change having eroded the notions of "natural" or technological 
monopoly in a number of industries, the institutional school had a new perspective to offer. 
 
  Chosen institutional arrangements vary significantly among our cases. In Argentina, capturing the 
nuclear engineering technological assets was achieved under the institutional aegis of the NAEC, while 
marketing those assets and related capabilities was eventually shifted to INVAP a NAEC's spin off. In 
Brazil, although the long term aim might have been the creation of a national aircraft industry, the 
enterprise, albeit public, was the structure selected from the very beginning. Ownership eventually  
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become mostly private and EMBRAER is now publicly listed in the NYSE. For Korean nationalistic 
ambitions to acquire new digital telephony  technologies, including design and manufacturing capabilities, 
the chosen structure was just a consortium of public and private entities to carry out R&D. Such an 
arrangement was ephemeral in nature and ended with the successful culmination of the R&D effort. 
 
  ACER adopted the private enterprise structure which must have been complemented with some 
kind of long term contractual assurances provided by their foreign clients as to the likelihood of 
continuing placing purchasing orders if quality and delivery requirements kept being met. Although 
ACER's case could be described as "out-sourcing", it was not the case that IT multinational producers 
went scouting around to find cheaper engineering and manufacturing skills to lower the cost of their 
computer products, but, instead, the development of a mutual, long term, commitment between ex-
employees returning home and their prior employers to join forces in lowering the cost and increasing 
the competitiveness of their output. This set up certainly lowered the relevant transaction costs, and can 
be seen as an example of Williamson's (2005) characterization of hybrid structures, somewhere 
between the market and the enterprise.  
 
       C. Economic Development 
  This literature emphasizes market failures due to underdevelopment as well as the effect of 
externalities that incomplete or non-existent markets cannot reflect accurately (Stiglitz, 1986, ch.4). 
Another vein is concerned with public goods such as nationalism that play an important role, for 
instance, when Gs promote industrialization via import substitution and protection. (see, for example, 
Johnson, 1967, ch. III). Still another depicts the apparent evolutionary nature of industrial and 
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  Interestingly, both Argentina's pursuit of atomic power capabilities and Brazil's of an 
autonomous aircraft industry, can be seen in the light of nationalistic public goods objectives quite 
successfully attained by public or bureaucratic entrepreneurs.
4 Korea's case is similar, but with the 
additional feature of not only capturing an advanced technological asset, but of using the undertaking to 
leapfrog the analogue phase in telephone switching equipment. 
    
  Thus from development economics w e get the notions that private entrepreneurship (and 
innovation) scarcity can be at times compensated by public sector interventions, and also that flexibility 
in institutional arrangements could be desirable when trying to acquire technological and manufacturing 
capabilities in new, advanced, fields. 
  Summary and Conclusions  
 
  Insights from Schumpeterian innovation, industrial organization, and economic development 
theories were used to attempt explaining firm behavior in cases of successful acquisition of advanced 
technological assets and international trade competitiveness by selected countries at an intermediate 
level of industrial and technological development. The critical role of innovator played at times by the 
State, as well as the existence of alternative forms of organization, emerged as the most salient general 
findings.   
 
  In all cases advanced technological assets were acquired in a semi-industrialized, developing 
country, environment. 
 
  Envisioning and carrying out innovations was done by public, or political, entrepreneurs in three 
                      
    4 Critics of public sector interventions may of course argue that these 
constitute exceptions and that the rule is generally the creation of "white 
elephants" rather than technologically advanced competitive enterprises.  
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of the four cases: nuclear engineering in Argentina, aircraft in Brazil, and digital telephony in Korea. 
 
  The institutional, or organizational, structures adopted were: In Argentina, public institutions; in 
Brazil, a public, later privatized, enterprise; in Korea a publicly coordinated R&D consortium, and in 
Taiwan a private enterprise enjoying special, long term contractual arrangements with foreign clients. 
 
  Basic scientific and engineering skills necessary for advanced technology acquisition were 
initially obtained in situ in all cases, supplemented by local R&D in Brazil, Korea and Taiwan, training 
abroad in Argentina and Taiwan, learning-by-doing in Argentina and Brazil, partnership agreements in 
Brazil, and know-how and other technical knowledge provided by customers in Taiwan.  
 
  Governments played significant supporting roles protecting incipient undertakings in Argentina 
and Brazil, coordinating R&D in Korea, and facilitating exports in Argentina, Brazil, and Korea. 
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